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The Science Communication Paradox and (Failed) Consensus Messaging 
The gap between scientific understanding and public perception of climate change remains 
at the forefront of science communication research. As of March 2018, The Yale Program on 
Climate Change Communication found that only 58% of Americans believe climate change is 
human caused—the same level as in 2009. In contrast, over 97% of climate scientists recognize 
anthropogenic climate change (Cook et al. 2013, Leiserowitz et al. 2014). There is good news. 
Despite persistently low acceptance of climate change science among certain populations, public 
belief levels have recovered since a staggering 14% drop in 2010 (Leiserowitz et al. 2018). To 
avoid unwarranted pessimism or optimism, this paper will simply echo a common summary: 
scientists are more sure of the severity and imminence of anthropogenic climate change than ever 
before, meanwhile, the public remains persistently divided along partisan and religious lines1. 
Kahan identifies several issues—including fracking, gun possession, and climate change—in 
which public perception diverges from expert understanding. He calls this phenomenon the science 
communication paradox. 
Climate change communication orthodoxy has long been that consensus messaging 
(relaying expert consensus to the public) is the best method to educate the public on climate change 
and overcome the science communication paradox. First promoted by the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1995, the strategy has received the lion’s share of climate change 
communication resources over the last two decades (Kahan 2015). Practitioners of consensus 
messaging rely on a wealth of studies showing that scientists overwhelmingly agree that climate 
change exists and is largely anthropogenic (Oresk 2004, Cook et al. 2013, Leiserowitz 2014). 
Additional research empirically argues in favor of consensus messaging, showing that educating 
                                               
1 Figure 1 shows how perceived risk of several issues correlates strongly with political affiliation/cultural 
worldview. For these issues, Kahan argues that people are relying on cues other than scientific understanding to 
form opinions (2015). Note that for most scientific issues, this is not the case. It is only for a select few issues in 
which technical topics accrue cultural significance that certain groups believe differently than scientific consensus.  
people about scientific consensus increases climate change belief (McCright et al. 2013, van der 
Linden et al. 2014, Cook and Lewandowsky 2016).  
 
Figure 1: “Polarized” vs. “unpolarized” risk perceptions (Kahan 2015) 
 
Despite its many proponents, consensus messaging has faced increased scrutiny in recent 
years. As Russill noted in 2018, “proposals to reshape [climate change communication] usual 
practices have proliferated rapidly and sharpened differences among experts regarding the nature 
and purposes of public communication on climate change” (1). Such proposals are motivated by a 
simple observation: climate change communicators have relied on consensus messaging for over 
two decades, yet climate change belief has not increased meaningfully since the early 2000s2.  
In their 2015 paper Geoengineering and Climate Science: Testing a Two Channel Model 
of Science Communication, Kahan et al. argue that the failure of consensus messaging lies in its 
inability to increase belief among people with conservative values (see next section). Polling data 
by Yale’s Program on Climate Change Communication supports this interpretation (see figure 2). 
First, note that public belief has slowly recovered since falling between 2008 and 2010. Although 
during that period of declining belief there was a slight decrease among liberal democrats, 
accompanied by a slightly greater decrease among moderate and conservative democrats, it is clear 
that the dramatic 20% drop among conservative Republicans and 10% drop among liberal and 
moderate Republicans accounts for most of the decline in overall levels. Furthermore, note the 
belief among democrats has remained largely stable since 2011, while trends in overall public 
belief (i.e. another dip from 2012 to 2013 followed by a gradual increase) have corresponded with 
more pronounced fluctuation in Republican belief levels. In total, there has been a 10% among 
conservative republicans since 2008, balanced out by slight increases in every other group.  
It follows that reducing the gap between scientific consensus and public belief lies 
primarily in increasing belief among conservatives. The fact that “about 75% of ‘conservatives’… 
know that scientists believe CO2 emissions increase atmospheric temperatures... yet only 25% of 
them say they ‘believe in’ human-caused climate change” suggests that consensus messaging is 
reaching conservatives but failing to convince them (Kahan 2015). In other words, the science 
communication paradox is not driven by lack of exposure to scientific information; instead, there 
are dynamics related to an individual's cultural identity affecting climate change belief.  
                                               
2 In their 2017 meta-analysis of climate change communication research, Egan and Mullin similarly find that 
“polling data about Americans’ attitudes on climate change reveals a lack of meaningful long-term change in mass 
opinion” (2017). 
 Figure 2: American climate change belief over time (Leiserowitz et al. 2018) 
 
solution, Kahan argues, is to examine how scientific issues accrue social and cultural significance 
in order to develop more effective communication strategies (2015). In the next section, I review 
Kahan’s explanation of what causes the science communication paradox and critically discuss his 
framework for overcoming it. 
 
Cultural Cognition and the Disentanglement Principle 
Emphasizing the impact of cultural commitments in risk perception and belief formation, 
Kahan’s Cultural Cognition Thesis offers a compelling explanation for the widely acknowledged 
Science Communication Paradox (Kahan et al. 2010, Kahan 2015). Kahan suggests that people 
have two channels for processing information: knowledge and culture. Being “cognitively prior” 
to knowledge, the cultural channel both colors how we perceive factual information and influences 
which information we expose ourselves to. In terms of risk assessment, this means that “groups of 
individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk in patterns that reflect and reinforce their 
distinctive understandings of how society should be organized” (Kahan 2015, 194). 
That culture is cognitively prior to information has little impact on the majority of scientific 
issues which are not imbued with cultural baggage; however, when inherently scientific issues (i.e. 
climate change) accrue cultural significance independent of expert consensus, individuals struggle 
to separate positions held by their group from facts. Consequently, conflicting cultural and 
scientific representations generate cognitive dissonance—dissonance that is often resolved by 
rationalizing views that contradict scientific consensus. This is why more/better information rarely 
changes opinions. 
Illustrated by studies indicating that certain issues engender greater social polarization as 
scientific literacy increases (Kahan et al 2012, Drummond and Fischoff 2017), cultural cognition 
denies that individuals are inherently rational or irrational. Unscientific positions are certainly 
irrational and obstruct progress yet holding such views may be considered rational for the 
individual since they reinforce group membership and identity. People employ motivated 
reasoning to justify opinions which align themselves most closely with what they are predisposed 
to believe (Khanna and Sood 2018, Kunda 1990). According to Kahan, these predispositions are 
cultural and scientifically literate individuals polarize because they are better equipped for such 
rationalization. Drummond and Fischoff suggest that increased polarization among more 
scientifically literate individuals “may reflect greater knowledge of when issues have divided 
along identity lines, greater ability to defend such beliefs, or greater confidence in one’s own 
knowledge”. Even Sunstein, a critique of the cultural cognition thesis, argued similarly in 2001 
that individuals adopt polarized group views in part due to “people’s desire to maintain their 
reputation and their self-conception.” 
Assuming the cultural cognition framework is valid, and the science communication 
paradox arises from conflicting factual and cultural representations of issues, the proscribed 
solution is to disentangle the question “what do we know” from the question “whose side are you 
on” (Kahan 2015). As Roos suggests, scientific issues become contested in public discourse 
“[w]hen more than one set of heuristics for judging the accuracy, legitimacy, and value of certain 
knowledge applies” (i.e. a religious vs. scientific framework for creation) (Roos 2017). This 
mirrors Kahan’s belief that the fundamental source of the paradox is the entanglement of opposing 
factual beliefs with people’s identities as members of one or another cultural group. Thus, when 
conflicts between identity and science arise, the best way to communicate relevant information to 
individuals and communities is to disentangle knowledge and identity. But despite its relative 
prominence, many questions surround the different calls for what Kahan labels ‘disentanglement’. 
Most significantly, how is this done? And does it effectively address the shortcomings of 
consensus messaging and other approaches? 
Kahan et al. (2015) took an important step in tackling the first question. Their paper 
hypothesizes that as individuals engage knowledge and cultural channels when processing 
information, “empirical claims about societal risk become suffused with antagonistic cultural 
meanings”. To test this hypothesis, the researchers fielded an experimental survey in which 
recipients were primed with different news stories appealing to various cultural values: a 
geoengineering article suggesting climate change mitigation coincides with innovation and 
industry, an anti-pollution article emphasizing egalitarian pollution control in industrialized 
countries, and an unrelated control article. Afterwards, respondents read all reading and assess a 
strictly factual climate change article.  
Subjects also completed a question battery measuring where they fell on two values 
spectrums: hierarchical to egalitarian versus individualistic versus communitarian. Kahan argues 
that these values (also referred to as ‘worldviews’) have special bearing on the topic of climate 
change. He explains, “individualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of 
environmental and technological risks, which if widely accepted would justify restricting 
commerce and industry... The same goes for individuals with hierarchical values, who see 
assertions of environmental risk as indictments of social elites. Individuals with egalitarian and 
communitarian values, in contrast, see commerce and industry as sources of unjust disparity and 
symbols of noxious self-seeking” (Kahan 2015, page 194; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). 
Kahan found that individuals who measured more hierarchical and individualistic were 
slightly more concerned about climate change when treated with geoengineering versus the control 
and significantly more concerned when treated with geoengineering versus anti-pollution. The 
difference between treatment groups suggests that being primed with information consistent with 
your value set (and in turn cultural identity) will influence your interaction with the ‘knowledge 
channel’. Hierarchical-individualists treated with the geoengineering article were led to believe 
human enterprise and ingenuity can solve climate change—aligning climate change responses with 
their value set and reducing combative cultural connotations, like egalitarian attacks on the status-
quo. In turn, they were better at assessing information presented by factual scientific articles and 
less skeptical of author bias.  
The idea that effective communication requires navigating cultural and political group 
identities is by no means exclusive to the body of work comprising cultural cognition (Gastil et al. 
2005; Graham et al. 2009; Hamilton et al. 2012; Jaspal et al. 2013; Kaplan et al. 2016; Feinberg 
and Willer 2015). For example, in the same year Kahan et al. published their geoengineering study, 
Feinberg and Willer advocated for “political persuasion that, rather than challenging one’s moral 
values, incorporates them into the argument.” In 2012, Hamilton et al. similarly noted that 
communicators should be aware that “strongly ideological respondents acquire information 
selectively in ways that reinforce their existing beliefs.” Also in 2012, Haidt likened the human 
mind to a rider and an elephant plotting a course—the rider (comparable to Kahan’s knowledge 
channel) has a minor correctional influence, while the elephant (the culture channel plus other 
biases) decides the overall direction. These scholars all agree when it comes to communicating 
important information, simply disseminating knowledge is not enough. Furthermore, all recognize 
that the ideological predispositions held by culturally defined individuals will not erode under 
barrages of credible evidence; rather, polarized narratives (credible or not) must instead be 
reframed, and information repackaged, to circumvent antagonistic cultural meanings and co-opt 
potentially constructive cultural values. 
On closer examination, it is clear that many of the different frameworks for approaches are 
largely the same. For example, in ‘disentangling’ knowledge from identity, Kahan uses 
geoengineering to ‘incorporate’ certain ‘values’ in people’s perception of climate change 
mitigation. Meanwhile, Feinberg and Willer and Hamilten et al. seemingly advocate for strategies 
that reduce what Kahan would call “antagonistic cultural meanings”. This overlap is indicative of 
some convergence in the study of culturally/morally informed communication. Kahan et al. noted 
over a decade ago that "a growing body of work suggests that cultural worldviews permeate all of 
the mechanisms through which individuals apprehend risk" (2006).  Interestingly, as the authors 
of this paper have observed, most researchers who discuss cultural communication in one form or 
another understate similarities between their frameworks and those of other researchers. In the 
interest of simplicity, this paper adopts the terminology of Kahan’s cultural cognition thesis. 
 
 
Criticisms and Unresolved Questions 
 Despite its apparent advantages, cultural cognition is not without its flaws. It is worth 
mentioning that Kahan’s relatively broad thesis is grounded in exclusively Western-oriented 
research on a specific set of phenomena, calling into question the scope of its application. 
Furthermore, Kahan lacks specificity and fails to define important terms like “culture” and 
“cognition” in his work (van der Linden 2016). Both lines of criticism have important implications 
when it comes to applying disentanglement strategies, both in the United States and abroad. 
 Another criticism of Kahan et al.’s geoengineering study is the unclear relation between 
values/worldview and group identity. Recall the lack of a precise definition of culture. Intuitively, 
culture could refer to an individual’s values, as well as their group commitments. In a general 
sense, culture is most likely a combination of values, group identity, and a host of other factors. 
However, whether disentanglement interacts more with values or group identity (in this case 
political affiliation) has bearing on the real-world applications of the disentanglement strategies. 
Kahan’s choice to sort respondents according to values scales, and not political affiliation, clearly 
shows that he thinks values are the stronger factor. This is not necessarily the case. It could be the 
case that people are actually adopting climate change stances following cues from their political 
in-group, and not necessarily their values. Citing research about ‘partisan motivated reasoning’ 
and people’s reliance on identity cues when assessing climate change information (Bolsen, 
Druckman, and Cook, 2013; Hart and Nisbet, 2012), van der Linden echoes the concern that Kahan 
et al. may actually be appealing to group commitments more so than an individual’s values (2016). 
I attempt to resolve this debate in this paper’s experimental survey. 
Another unanswered, but crucial question when it comes to applying the disentanglement 
principle, is how durable we can expect the disentanglement result to be? To determine how we 
might go about finding an answer, let us start with a critical examination of the mechanics behind 
disentanglement and the findings from Kahan et al.’s geoengineering paper. First, note that Kahan 
refines his description of the disentanglement mechanic from his initial paper reporting the 
geoengineering experiment to his subsequent paper What is the ‘science of science 
communication’? In fact, the term ‘disentanglement’ does even not appear in the geoengineering 
paper. Regardless, both papers offer similar, and overall consistent, descriptions of how 
geoengineering information interacts with the two channels in the cultural cognition model. The 
experimental paper says that “[the geoengineering article] transmits, via Channel 2 (knowledge), 
meanings that offset the pressure on people to dismiss the information content being transmitted 
via Channel 1 (culture)” (Kahan 2015, page 200). The subsequent paper similarly states that “the 
information on geoengineering dissolved the conflict those individuals experienced between 
crediting human-caused global warming and forming stances that express their defining 
commitments” (Kahan 2015, page 8).  
Both descriptions emphasize reducing dissonance between culture and the logical 
implications of specific knowledge. The objective is not to change what message people receive 
from Channel 2 to make them more likely to trust climate science due to their cultural perspective. 
Instead, it is to reduce the cultural channel’s prominence when individuals interact with climate 
change information.  
It is unclear whether Kahan’s experiment actually demonstrates that the knowledge and 
culture channels are being disentangled. For example, in the geoengineering experiment it might 
not be the case that the culture channel is not offset in the geoengineering group. Subjects might 
be relying just as heavily on their cultural channel but are convinced in that moment that their 
group identity/values align more with the specific piece of information being presented. If this is 
the case and individuals are not actually engaging more with their knowledge channel, then we 
might expect the effect to be less durable. In the long run, without being anchored in their own 
critical assessment of information, subjects' views will quickly revert to their in-group’s 
entrenched position3.  
Now, let us assume that the geoengineering article did offset the culture channel and 
subjects engaged with the scientific article more objectively. It is unclear whether this effect will 
remain if science communicators use disentanglement strategies in settings where people are 
exposed to reminders of their cultural positions. This is important given the widespread practice 
of ‘false media balancing’—the tendency of media news outlets to present climate science in 
tandem with climate skeptics. (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Dixon and Clark 2013). This 
misleading representation of climate change as a disputed issue decreases just about every metric 
of climate change support (Malka et al. 2009). Furthermore, this illusion of contested knowledge 
“can lead to a negative assessment of the opposed sphere spilling over into uncontested areas of 
knowledge,” which leads to climate change becoming a symbol of outside cultural disputes (Roos 
2017, page 6). In practice, the result is that climate change communicators relying on facts are 
often forced to compete against skeptics relaying cultural positions. If it turns out that efforts to 
disentangle the culture and knowledge channel are completely undone if audiences are reminded 
of cultural positions at the same time, the potential applications of disentanglement would be 
severely limited. If, on the other hand, the effect remains despite the presence of cultural reminders, 
then disentanglement may be a durable, broadly applicable communication strategy. 
 
Thesis 
 Kahan et al. found that the geoengineering article reduced the role of the culture channel 
in processing climate change information. To test the durability of this effect, I inserted paragraphs 
reminders for liberal and conservative cultural positions as treatment levels and used the original 
                                               
3 Kahan et al. call for more research into the long-term effect of disentanglement, as well (2015). 
geoengineering article as the control. Unlike Kahan et al.’s nationally representative samples from 
the United States and the United Kingdom, I restricted the study to just self-identified U.S. 
Republicans. I then measured respondents' assessment of the same scientific article from Kahan et 
al.’s study using same study validity and climate change belief question batteries. The first 
measure, study validity, is a combined score of four questions asking how credible respondents 
found the scientists and to what degree their results should inform public decision making. The 
second measure, climate change risk, similarly consisted of four questions asking whether climate 
change is real and is anthropogenic, as well as how much risk it poses. 
 If the geoengineering article increases objective assessment of climate change information 
by offsetting the culture channel, then any increased reliance on the culture channel should 
decrease the disentangling effect. That is, it should not matter which cultural reminders subjects 
are exposed to—what matters is that subjects are reminded that climate change is a culturally 
charged issue and that different positions express different group commitments. Between the 
conservative and liberal reminder treatments, nothing in the theory suggests that one will 
inherently impede disentanglement more than the other. Since the conservative reminder appeals 
directly to the hierarchical-egalitarian worldview, it would not be surprising if it impeded 
disentanglement more. The liberal reminder, on the other hand, could engender some sort of 
factional reaction and thereby reinforce the tendency to reject information counter to the 
conservative position. As a result, I suspect that subjects in all treatment conditions will report 
lower study validity and climate change risk than the control. Respondents who receive both the 
liberal and conservative reminder should be the most conscious of cultural positions, and therefore 
will report the lowest study validity and climate change risk of all the groups. 
 H1a: Respondents receiving any treatment will decrease their self-reported study  
validity or climate change risk compared to control.  
H1b: Respondents who are given both reminders will report the lowest levels of study 
validity and climate change risk. 
Although Kahan et al.'s treatments had no meaningful main effect on study validity and 
climate change risk, they found significant interaction between the experimental manipulation and 
subjects’ cultural worldviews. In particular, respondents with conservative values (more 
hierarchical and individualist) reported significantly higher study validity when given the 
geoengineering article. Hierarchical respondents also reported significantly higher climate change 
risk in the geoengineering treatment than in the anti-pollution treatment, even if there was no 
significant difference between geoengineering and the control. 
We should anticipate a similar interaction between worldview and the treatment 
manipulations. Recall, however, the discussion on cultural worldview versus group identity. By 
sorting subjects according to values and group identity (in this case political affiliation), the authors 
of the geoengineering study suggest that values, more so than political affiliation, influences how 
individuals pick their cultural positions. But these worldview scales could merely be good 
analogues for political affiliation. This debate can be resolved by comparing the significance and 
effect size of the treatments conditioned by political affiliation (how strongly respondents identify 
with the Republican party) versus the worldview scales. It should be the case that group 
membership will interact more strongly with the treatments that values/worldview scales, i.e. there 
will be a larger effect size and higher significance for treatment effect on the dependent variables 
when conditioned by political affiliation. 
H2: The effect of the treatment will be conditioned more by self-reported partisanship than 
by worldview. 
Another important finding of Kahan et al.’s paper was the reduced polarization between 
the hierarchical-individualists and individual-communitarians. It is worth considering how this 
effect might translate to a sample of only Republicans. That is, will the cultural reminder 
treatments still affect hierarchical and individualist subjects differently than more egalitarian and 
communitarian ones. If the disentangling effect is completely offset among more hierarchical and 
individualist respondents who are treated with cultural reminders, it might be the case that only 
Republicans who are already egalitarian or communitarian should be the focus of disentanglement 
efforts. If, on the other hand, there is not a significant gap between the two ends of the spectrum, 
then maybe disentanglement is viable for more than a set of ‘low-hanging fruit’ (i.e. Republicans 
who have more ‘liberal’ values). Unlike in Kahan et al.’s sample containing the full political 
spectrum, it seems unlikely that we will see a similar trend towards convergence of the ends of 
each value scale (assuming there is a meaningful difference between them to begin with). Instead, 
I suspect that both respondents who are more hierarchical/individualist and those who are more 
egalitarian/communitarian will report higher study validity and climate change risk in the control 
group than in the treatments. 
H3a: Both hierarchical/individuals and egalitarian/communitarian respondents will 
report higher study validity and climate change risk in the control than in the treatment 
groups.  
H3b: The effect of the treatments will be larger for hierarchical/individualists 
 
Methodology 
Sample: 
 The sample consists of 1,180 nationally representative Republicans from the United States. 
Respondents fitting this criterion were identified by the Lucid survey company, and the experiment 
included questions confirming their political affiliation. I further measured respondents along 
Kahan’s the two value scales (hierarchical-egalitarian and individual-communitarian) and a 
question on party affiliation, as a check on Lucid’s reported data. 
Appropriating Kahan’s Geoengineering Treatment: 
 To quickly recap, Kahan had respondents read two selections. Respondents were first given 
one of three news articles to read. One of these articles was a piece about geoengineering that 
disentangled respondent’s cultural and knowledge channels. The second selection was an excerpt 
from an article published in the journal Nature Science. That article, a composite of real pieces 
published in Nature (Allen et al. 2009) and the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
(Solomon et al. 2009), suggested that the effects of greenhouse gas emissions might be more severe 
than originally thought.  
 I use Kahan’s geoengineering article as the baseline condition (see figure 23. For the 
treatments, I inserted paragraphs into the geoengineering article voicing the perspective of either 
an environmental advocate, a conservative senator, or both. These paragraphs are intended to 
remind the reader of the cultural dimension of climate change as a contested issue in the public in 
the midst of the very cue that should be disentangling them. Respondents were randomly assigned 
one of four groups and asked to read a news article. They either received Kahan’s unaltered 
geoengineering article (the control), Kahan’s article with an inserted liberal reminder, Kahan’s 
article with an inserted conservative reminder, or Kahan’s article with both a liberal and 
conservative reminder.  
The liberal reminder paragraph contained arguments by a fictitious environmental advocate 
calling for greater contributions from developed nations. It draws inspiration from Kahan’s 
‘Antipollution Condition’ treatment (the counterpart to the geoengineering article in Kahan’s 
study). The conservative reminder presented fabricated quotes from Alabama Senator Richard 
Shelby questioning the validity and motives of a report mentioned in the article.  
Figure 3: Kahan et al.’s geoengineering article (2015) 
Liberal reminder paragraph:  
Prominent environmental advocate John Herthman felt it important to add, “we will all need 
to make sacrifices.” In a press conference following the report’s publication he noted, “it’s 
precisely because the residents of industrialized countries have for decades insisted on a standard 
of living that exceeds the capacities of the natural environment that we in this mess.” His words 
echoing a widespread sentiment that climate change impacts the disadvantaged most and that 
advantaged countries and citizens must take a proactive role in solving the problem. 
Conservative reminder paragraph: 
Republican Senator Richard Shelby from Alabama, however, voiced disagreement with the 
study’s proposal, claiming that “this [study] is just another attempt to increase already unnecessary 
funding for climate change, which by the way the science hasn’t proven.” In a press conference 
following the report’s release Shelby added, “there are politicians who already plan on using this 
research to support an agenda of wasting even more American tax dollars.” 
Design: 
Respondents were first asked to complete a 12-question battery asking to what degree they 
agreed with statements like “The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives” and 
“Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.” These questions, 
taken directly from Kahan’s survey, measured the hierarchical-egalitarian and individual-
communitarian value sets4. I inserted an additional question measuring respondents' initial 
perception of how biased climate change scientists are. 
Next, respondents were assigned one of the four versions of the geoengineering article 
previously described (control, liberal reminder, conservative reminder, or both). A series of time 
                                               
4 In the analysis, comparisons between respondents on different ends of the worldview spectrum means comparing 
respondents ±1 standard deviation on the worldview scales. For example, an egalitarian respondent would be one 
who measures above one standard deviation on the hierarchical-egalitarian scale. 
checks were included to kick respondents who were not sufficiently engaging with the articles. 
Depending on what treatment respondents received, they were required to spend between 40 and 
60 seconds reading the article in the first treatment level. There was a similar time check on the 
Nature Science article. Attempting to click next before spending enough time on the article kicked 
respondents and their responses were not included in the final data. Respondents had the option to 
select ‘Just Text’ to view the article in large, plain text format without photos (the photo captions 
were included).  
After reading their article, respondents were asked several follow-up questions checking 
compliance. Among them, there was a question asking respondents to identify people who featured 
in the article they read. The correct answer for this question depended on which treatment they 
received. This question can be used to check both compliance and how closely they read the 
treatment paragraph. 
Upon completing the compliance check, respondents were given the Nature Science from 
Kahan’s survey followed by several questions measuring compliance. Finally, respondents 
reported how credible they found the Nature Science article to be and what they thought of climate 
change. Questions such as “how convincing was the study” and “(how much do you agree that) 
the scientists who did the study were biased” were combined to form a score called study validity. 
Questions such as “how much risk would you say climate change poses to human health, safety, 
or prosperity?” and “(how much do you agree that) human activity is causing global temperatures 
to rise” were combined to form a scale scored called climate change risk. The study validity and 
climate change risk scores are this study’s dependent variables. 
 
 
 
Results 
There were no main treatment effects on study validity or climate change risk. Like in 
Kahan et al.’s study, subjects were relatively ambivalent towards the treatments. While there was 
no significant difference between the treatments and the control, there was some significant 
variation among the treatments for study validity. Specifically, the difference between the liberal 
reminder treatment and conservative reminder treatment trended towards significance (p = 0.061) 
and the difference between the liberal reminder and both reminders was significance (p = 0.034). 
This was not the case for climate change risk, for which there were no significant differences 
between the treatments whatsoever.   
 Both cultural worldview scales had strong positive correlations with study validity and 
climate change risk (p < 0.001 for all). The coefficients of change were noticeably larger in the 
regressions of worldview scales and climate change risk than in the regressions of worldview 
scales and study validity (hier-egal: 0.579 vs 0.309; ind-com: 0.384 vs 0.279). Similarly, self-
reported party affiliation (where a higher score indicated closer affiliation with the Republican 
party) correlated negatively with study validity (p = 0.0005) and climate change (p < 0.001). 
Also as expected, self-identified partisanship correlated strongly with hierarchy (p < 0.001) and 
individualism (p = 0.0038). 
 Figure 4 displays the graphs of study validity (SV) and climate change risk (CC_Risk) 
conditioned by the two worldview scales (Hier_Egal and Ind_Com) and partisanship 
(PartyScore). Notice that there is extremely little variation between the treatments when 
conditioned for the hierarchical-egalitarian and individual-communitarian scales. There also 
appears to be more variation between the treatments (although not statistically significant) when 
conditioned for partisanship. The results did not demonstrate with significance that hypothesis 
two was correct, however, the graphs in Figure 4 hint that a result might be detected with a larger 
sample size.  
Figure 4: The Effect of Treatment Group on Study Validity and Climate Change Risk 
Conditioned for Worldviews and Partisanship. 
 Subjects at either end of the hierarchical-egalitarian spectrum reacted differently to 
different treatments. When assigned the conservative reminder treatment, hierarchs behaved as 
expected and reported lower study validity (p = 0.005) and climate change risk (p = 0.003). They 
did not differ meaningfully from the control in either the liberal reminder or both reminders 
treatments. Egalitarians, on the other hand, behaved contrary to expectations and trended towards 
higher study validity (p = .061). This does not support hypothesis 3a, which predicts that both 
hierarchical/individuals and egalitarian/communitarian respondents will report higher study 
validity and climate change risk in the control than in the treatment groups. However, the 
existence of significant treatment effects suggests that the null result still gives us meaningful 
information. 
  Like in Kahan et al.’s study, the hierarchical-egalitarian scale interacted more with 
treatment manipulations than the individualist-communitarian scale in this experiment. Although 
communitarians reported higher study validity and climate change risk across all treatments than 
individualists, there were no meaningful treatment effects among just communitarians or 
individualists.  
 During analysis it became clear that when asked who featured in their article, respondents 
were much better at recalling Republican Senator Richard Shelby (either in the conservative 
reminder or both treatment) than the environmentalist Alan Herthman (either in the liberal 
reminder of both treatment). Of the 327 respondents who received both cultural reminders, 57 
recalled both, 149 recalled just Shelby, and a mere 30 recalled just Herthman (the rest failed to 
correctly identify any of them). Similar discrepancies were observed in the treatments containing 
just one reminder.  
 This could simply be because many respondents may have previously heard of Senator 
Shelby. It could also be that respondents were more attentive to information reaffirming their 
position. Interesting, it turned out that reported treatment turned out to be a very strong predictor 
of climate change risk. Specifically, respondents who identified Shelby as having featured in 
their article reported lower climate change risk than respondents who answered both (p = 0.038) 
and Herthman (p = 0.047). This significance disappears when we examine only respondents who 
correctly recalled who featured in the article they read (likely due to insufficient sample size). 
  
Analysis and Interpretation 
The absence of a general treatment effect does not support hypotheses 1a or 1b, which 
predicted that all treatments would show reduced study validity and climate change risk and that 
the both treatments display the largest decrease. The charitable interpretation of this result is that 
the disentanglement effect was overall very durable. Even after being reminded that climate 
change has cultural significance, treatment group subjects continued to report similar study 
validity and climate change risk levels as those in the control. Assuming 1) that the 
geoengineering article was disentangling the respondents and 2) the treatments were sufficient 
reminders that climate change carries cultural baggage, this result bodes well for real life efforts 
to apply disentanglement. 
Another interpretation is that treatments were too subtle. Given that Kahan et al. found no 
main treatment effect either and that my treatments were far subtler than theirs (inserted 
paragraphs as opposed to completely different articles), it is perhaps not a surprise that there was 
no general treatment effect. It could also be the case that the disentanglement effect is already so 
small that the potential effect of the cultural reminders is miniscule to begin with.  
Not only did the treatments not report significantly lower study validity or climate change 
risk, but the liberal reminder group differed meaningfully from the both reminders and the 
conservative reminder groups. This undermines the idea that any reminder that climate change is 
a culturally contested issue position should impede the disentanglement effect similarly by 
bolstering reliance on the culture channel. If Kahan theoretical analysis was correct—i.e. the 
difference between how typical and disentangled subjects perceived study validity and climate 
change risk was a result of disentanglement reducing reliance on the culture channel—then all 
treatment groups should have behaved similarly. Thus, this divergence may show that instead of 
increasing or reducing reliance on the culture channel, the treatments merely appealed to cultural 
biases differently. This begs the question, did the geoengineering article actually cause 
respondents to engage more objectively with scientific information in the first place or did it just 
momentarily bolster certain cultural predispositions? I hope that these results can inform 
researchers explore this question in future studies. 
As suspected, worldview and political affiliation were very closely related. Recall van der 
Linden’s concern that Kahan et al.’s geoengineering article could be actually applying more to 
group identity than to worldview/values. My examination of the treatment effects conditional on 
the hierarchical-egalitarian scale, individual-communitarian scale, and partisanship hinted at van 
der Linden being correct. Although the treatment effects conditioned by partisanship did not 
display significant at 95% confidence interval, they did appear to vary more from the control 
than those condition for worldview.  
This interpretation is challenged by the finding that the hierarchical-egalitarian scale 
interacted strongly with the certain treatments for more relatively hierarchical and relatively 
egalitarian respondents (±1 standard deviation). Contrary to my expectation that the treatments 
would decrease study validity and climate change risk regardless of worldview, the liberal and 
conservative reminders interacted differently with hierarchical respondents than with egalitarian 
respondents. Specifically, egalitarians reported higher study validity when exposed to the liberal 
reminder and hierarchical respondents reported lower study validity and climate change risk 
when exposed to the conservative reminder. 
What does this mean for science communicators? First, it shows that not all Republicans 
respond to climate change information the same way. If, for example, communicators wanted to 
appeal to a subpopulation they knew to be particularly hierarchical in worldview, strategies that 
might be expected to work on egalitarian populations would likely be ineffective. Broadly stated, 
appealing to Republicans as a monolith will likely be less effective than creating nuanced 
communication strategies that appeal to certain values/worldviews.  
In both Kahan et al.’s study and ours, the hierarchical-egalitarian worldview scale 
interacted more with the various treatments than the individualist-communitarian scale. Although 
the individualist-communitarian scale was a strong predictor of study validity and climate change 
risk, there was very little evidence of meaningful interaction with experimental manipulations. Is 
this dynamic generally true? That is, does the hierarchical-egalitarian worldview spectrum 
generally interact more with climate change communication strategies or is this just a product of 
our specific research instruments? Going forward, science communication researchers should 
prioritize inquiries, like this, which clarify how specific cultural elements can bolster real world 
climate change communication efforts.  
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